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Abstract 
 
Using a proprietary dataset provided by a major manufacturer of aircraft engines, we empirically 
investigate the impact of incentives present in after-sales repair and maintenance support 
contracts on product reliability.  In particular, we compare the reliability of products under time 
and material (T&M) contracts, which have been used traditionally in the airline industry, with 
the reliability under performance-based contracts (PBC), which are gaining wide acceptance.  
We discover that there is inherent endogeneity in contract choices by the customers.  To account 
for this endogeneity, we estimate a two-stage econometric model, and find that larger customers 
and users of certain equipment types are more likely to select PBC over T&M contracts.  After 
controlling for this selection process, we find evidence for the positive and significant effect of 
performance incentives created by PBC on product reliability.  Our estimates indicate an 
improvement of product reliability in the 10-25% range under PBC, compared to the reliability 
observed under T&M contracts.  This finding is robust to numerous alternative specifications, 
modeling assumptions and estimation methods.  Thus our research provides a valuable input into 
the ongoing policy debate about the effectiveness of performance contracts which are currently 
being introduced extensively in both the government and the private sectors.  
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1.  Introduction 
The move to performance-based contracting (PBC) represents a fundamental shift in customer-
supplier relationships for after-sales product support.  A PBC contract will pay the service 
provider on the basis of product use or “up-time” 1, whereas under traditional Time and Material 
(T&M) contracts the customer pays the supplier for resources consumed due to the occurrence of 
product failures and maintenance events.  The former approach, which in some industries is 
referred to as “servicization” (see, for example, Toffel 2002), essentially converts the sale of 
service products (such as spare parts and repair labor) to the customer into the sale of a service 
that enables the customer to generate value through the use of the product.  
While the provision of after-sales support is a major driver of revenue and profit in many 
industries, the movement to PBC is especially relevant for after-sales product support in the 
aerospace and defense industry where products are “mission critical”, since their unavailability 
due to either scheduled or unscheduled maintenance can be very costly.  The movement toward 
performance-based servicization is motivated by the premise that PBC aligns incentives between 
the customer and the supplier, so that both benefit when the product‟s use generates value to the 
customer.  As a consequence, most observers expect that the adoption of PBC will lead to more 
effective value creation, i.e., with a higher level of performance and a lower cost to the customer, 
as well as a higher level of profit to the supplier of support services.  A growing body of 
literature (e.g., Kim et al. 2007, 2008, 2009) analyzes this issue from an economic and operations 
modeling perspective.  The results of that research indicate that it is possible to design 
coordinating contracts based on performance and that under such contracts, suppliers and 
customers have a strong incentive to increase product availability through various means that 
include improving support capabilities, investing in an appropriate level of support resources, 
and improving the underlying reliability of the products.  While the managerial and analytical 
arguments for PBC are pervasive, empirical research to support these conclusions is currently 
non-existent. 
The evidence that PBC for aftermarket support and system sustainment has a positive impact 
on performance primarily originates from industry reports that are not based on rigorous 
analysis. These reports and conventional wisdom suggest that PBC improves service outcomes, 
                         
1 A typical performance-based contract will include terms that lead to payment to suppliers based on the number of 
hours the product has been used and/or the level of availability of key resources.  
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i.e., it can lead to higher product availability, lower cost of ownership, and reduced customer 
wait times. Kirk and DePalma (2006), for example, analyze a PBL
2
 program in the Navy and, 
based on a review of historical repair frequency data for several programs, concluded that “there 
is some evidence that the PBL contract may have helped to improve availability and reliability”.  
Not surprisingly, questions have been raised about the quality of the data and the associated 
analysis presented in such reports.  For example, in a recent report the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) states that, “Many DOD program offices that implemented PBL 
arrangements have limited cost data, and various other factors – such as the lack of business case 
analyses – further limit an evaluation of the costs of this support strategy. Available data from 
the programs GAO reviewed indicated mixed results” (GAO 2008). 
The need for empirical research to better understand the effects of PBC is particularly 
relevant considering not only the paucity of scientific evidence, but also the economic impact 
associated with after-sales support services.  For example, according to Standard and Poor‟s 
(2009), the global maintenance, repair and overhaul sector generated revenues of $117 billion in 
2007, of which $45 billion relates to commercial aircraft.  More generally, reported statistics (see 
Cohen et al. 2006 and the references therein) indicate that sales of spare parts and after-sales 
services in the U.S. represents 8% of annual domestic product, meaning that customers spend 
approximately $1 trillion every year on assets they already own.  The investment in resources 
required to enable the delivery of services to support products is also huge, e.g. spare parts 
inventory investment has been observed to be 5% of sales in computer and high technology 
industries (Cohen et al. 1997). 
The findings of this paper are especially timely as performance-based contracts for after-sales 
support have become increasingly popular in industries such as aerospace and defense, 
automobile, semiconductors, information technology and software development (e.g., Software 
as a Service).  The adoption of contractual relationships based on performance for after-sales 
support and other services also spans the public sector.  In the U.S., the federal government, and 
the Defense Department in particular, has mandated this form of contracting for services on a 
wide-spread basis.  Nonetheless, there is an ongoing debate between suppliers of support 
services and the various federal agencies who are engaged in implementing performance-based 
                         
2 Performance-based contracting is also referred to as Performance-based Logistics (PBL) and Power by the Hour® 
in the defense and commercial aerospace industries, respectively. The latter is a registered  Rolls-Royce trademark. 
4 
 
programs, regarding the value of contractual relationships based on performance.  In addition, 
the GAO, as noted above, has questioned the accuracy of predictions of the positive impact of 
PBC and the House of Representatives recently held a hearing on the benefits and costs of PBC.
3
   
In this paper, we focus on repair and maintenance services for commercial aircraft in the 
aerospace and defense industry where PBC for after-sales support has been in place for many 
years.  Our proprietary dataset comes from Rolls-Royce, which, as a major supplier of aircraft 
engines, provides repair and maintenance services to its customers under two different types of 
contracts: T&M and PBC.  The main question we analyze is the following: Does the use of PBC 
have a positive effect on product reliability over the use of T&M?  Our focus on reliability is 
grounded on a theoretical prediction that reliability is likely to be impacted by the choice of 
contracts (Kim et al. 2008).  Intuitively, T&M does not create a strong incentive to improve 
reliability, as the supplier‟s compensation under T&M is proportional to the amount of consumed 
service resources, which decreases as products fail or are serviced less often (i.e., products 
become more reliable). PBC, on the other hand, promotes investing in reliability improvement as 
doing so leads to higher product up-time, which in turn brings larger financial gains to the 
supplier.  While a linkage between product reliability and performance-based incentives is 
seemingly intuitive, prior to this paper it has never been verified empirically, and the extent of 
this relationship has never been estimated.  Our analysis, which uses a two-stage framework that 
explicitly deals with the endogeneity inherent in contract choice by a customer, provides 
evidence that PBC, indeed, improves product reliability.  Our results quantify the observed 
benefits – about a 10-25% reliability improvement – that these contracts have generated in our 
sample.  These findings are robust to a number of specifications and modeling assumptions.  
While the focus of this paper is on PBC for commercial aircraft after-sales services, our findings 
are also relevant to other industries that provide after-sales support for mission critical products. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review relevant literature on supply chain 
contracting.   In Sections 3 and 4 we describe the industrial context and the data, and continue 
with presentation of the econometric analysis and the model specification in Section 5.  In 
Section 6 we discuss estimation results, robustness checks, and limitations of our analysis. 
Section 7 concludes the paper. 
                         
3“Performance-based Acquisitions: Creating Solutions or Causing Problems?” Full Committee Thursday, May 08, 
2008.  http://homeland.house.gov/hearings/index.asp?ID=136. 
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2.  Literature Review 
There has been substantial interest in the operations management literature concerning the role of 
contracts in supply chains.  Cachon (2003) provides an extensive and relatively recent review of 
more than 200 papers in this area.  As noted there, “the literature contains a considerable amount 
of theory, but an embarrassingly paltry amount of empiricism.” Although papers such as Novak 
and Eppinger (2001) and Novak and Stern (2008, 2009), for example, empirically examined the 
impact of product characteristics on vertical integration decisions in the automobile industry, the 
numerous theoretical predictions in the OM literature related to contractual incentives, for the 
most part, have not received comparable empirical scrutiny.  The findings of this paper, 
contribute to filling this gap in the literature by providing an empirical validation of the 
hypothesis generated by an earlier theoretical study (Kim et al. 2008). 
In contrast to the current state of empirical OM research on supply chain contracting, 
researchers in other areas have been quite active in studying similar topics.  In economics, 
several papers have studied revenue sharing contracts in the video rental industry.  Mortimer 
(2008), for example, analyzes fixed-price vs. revenue sharing contracts between distributors and 
retailers using a structural equation econometric approach.  Her results indicate that both 
downstream and upstream firms‟ profits for popular titles increase by 10% under revenue sharing 
contracts and consumers are also generally better off.  Ho et al. (2008) and Ioannou et al. (2009) 
investigate other aspects of revenue sharing contracts in this industry.  In addition, several 
empirical papers examine franchising contracts (e.g., Lafontaine and Shaw 1999, Lafontaine and 
Slade 2001).  Finally, there is a stream of literature that studies incentive alignment between 
firms and their employees by means of different variants of pay-for-performance contracts.  
Examples include Prendergast (1999, 2002a, 2002b), Lazear (2000) and Banker et al. (2001).  
Although this research on performance-based contracts is distinct from ours because of its focus 
on a labor setting, we note two results from this literature that are relevant to our study: (i) 
employees respond to incentives which usually improve firm performance, and (ii) there is self-
selection of better employees through pay for performance schemes.  The findings of our paper 
offer similar insights in the firm-to-firm aftermarket support setting. 
PBC has also received attention in application areas such as health care, public policy, and 
software development.  The empirical results in Lu et al. (2003) show that PBC leads to more 
referrals and a better match between illness and treatment intensity, suggesting that PBC induces 
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incentive alignment.  Shen (2003) finds that PBC provides incentives for nonprofit providers of 
substance abuse treatment to select less severe patients into treatment. Other examples from the 
public sector include Heinrich (2002), who analyzes outcome-based performance management 
using data from federal job-training programs and a case study by Heinrich and Choi (2007), 
based on social welfare programs in Wisconsin, showing that the service provider responded to 
the incentives afforded by PBC. 
In the context of offshore software development, Gopal et al. (2003) analyze the impact of 
fixed-price vs. T&M contracts on software vendor profits.  As we do, they use a two-stage 
approach that includes modeling of the determinants of contract choice in the vendor-developer 
relationship.  Their results indicate that vendor profits are higher under T&M contracts, 
controlling for variables such as project type and effort.  Gopal and Sivaramakrishnan (2008) 
extend this analysis further by examining the impact that factors such as project size and 
duration, team size, and risk of employee attrition, have on contract choice. 
The papers noted above study the influence of contracts on different performance outcomes.  
In our research, an equally important issue is determining the factors that influence contract 
choice.  A number of papers examine contract choice in different contexts.  Examples include 
Slade (1996), who studies contracts between oil companies and their service stations and tests 
various multitask agency hypotheses as drivers of contract choice. Ackerberg and Botticini 
(2002) examine contract choices using archival data on agricultural contracts between a landlord 
and tenants, and test hypotheses related to the role of risk sharing and transaction costs on 
contract selection.  Using data from U.S. Air Force engine procurement, Crocker and Reynolds 
(1993) analyze how different variables affect the degree of contract completeness (i.e., how 
precisely the contract specifies future duties and contingencies) that parties choose.  
Our paper also contributes to the growing stream of empirical research in operations 
management.  Papers that are related to ours include Ramdas and Randall (2008), who find that 
component sharing in the automotive industry can hurt product reliability.  We also study 
reliability empirically but in a different industry and in the contracting choice context.  In an 
empirical study that focuses on after-sales support for defense systems, Deshpande et al. (2003) 
analyze how the interaction of attributes such as the criticality and cost of service parts and the 
nature of inventory policies to manage them affect performance.  As in our case, this is an 
empirical study in an aftermarket context, although it is not focused on reliability or contracting.  
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Terwiesch et al. (2005) empirically analyze demand forecast sharing in the buyer/supplier 
contractual relationship in an application to the semiconductor industry.  Their analysis indicates 
that non-optimal gaming behavior among all parties occurs as a consequence of conflicting 
incentive schemes.  While this paper is not about contracting, it is related to our research since it 
empirically studies the role of incentives in an operational context.  Finally, in a study related to 
PBC, Lee and Zenios (2007) develops a performance-based payment system for Medicare by 
empirically estimating data from patients needing kidney dialysis.  
To summarize, we note that while fields such as economics, public policy, information 
systems, and healthcare have generated many examples of empirical research on the role of 
performance contracting, this has not been the case in operations management, despite 
significant attention that has been given to supply chain contracting research.  Thus, in addition 
to providing a scientific input to the ongoing policy debate on performance incentives for 
government and defense service procurement, our paper contributes to the existing OM literature 
as it represents one of the few empirical studies of supply chain contracting.  As a result, we 
believe that our paper contributes to closing the gap between theory and practice in this 
important area of OM research.  Finally, to the best of our knowledge, our paper provides the 
first empirical comparison between performance contracts and non-performance contracts that 
are used for aftermarket customer support. 
3.  Industry Background 
In this paper we focus on the maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) industry for commercial 
aircraft.  According to the previously noted Standard and Poor‟s industry report (2009), this 
sector generated revenues of $117 billion in 2007, of which $60 billion was related to military 
MRO, $45 billion to air transport (commercial aircraft) MRO, and $12 billion to business and 
general aviation MRO.  Aircraft owners (e.g., airlines) face the problem of properly managing 
maintenance and repair of aircraft equipment, including managing the risk of infrequent 
equipment failures and the disruption of scheduled maintenance checks, so as to preserve aircraft 
availability, thus avoiding the high opportunity cost of having an aircraft on-the-ground.  
Customers typically purchase after-sales service support from the OEM and/or other service 
suppliers on either a transaction basis (i.e., through T&M contracts), or negotiate a contract for 
support where payment is based on the number of flying hours (i.e., PBC). 
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Aircraft fleet availability therefore is the most important performance metric for airlines and 
other customers.  We note that availability is influenced by several factors that include 
subsystem and part reliability, spare parts inventory, repair capacity and repair lead time.  For 
example, if a critical part of an aircraft subsystem stops functioning, it must be replaced by a 
working unit drawn from the spares inventory (if it is available) as soon as possible to minimize 
disruption to flight schedules.  All broken units are ultimately returned to a support depot where 
they are either repaired or scrapped.  A key challenge for both customers and suppliers in this 
industry is to reduce the cost of failures while maintaining an acceptable level of fleet uptime 
(availability) through the management of resources (i.e., spare parts inventory and repair 
capacity) and through interventions that could affect the reliability of the product and/or the 
performance of the support processes. 
Recently, the airlines have adopted outsourcing strategies for MRO services in order to focus 
on their core activities and reduce costs.  This trend has led to expansion of the range of MRO 
services offered by suppliers of various types of aircraft subsystems (e.g., hydraulic power, 
engine, landing gear, avionic system).  Typically, it is the OEMs themselves that offer support 
services for their subsystem products because the highly customized and complex nature of their 
products makes it difficult for a third party to provide similar product care.  The provision of 
such services is also very profitable with margins that often exceed those associated with the sale 
of the product.  Examples of such major (OEM) suppliers in the MRO industry include Pratt & 
Whitney, General Electric Co., Rolls Royce, Honeywell Aerospace, Lockheed Martin and 
Boeing.  There are also many smaller MRO companies that provide a wide range of services that 
include scheduled maintenance checks and parts repair.  Such providers include the Triumph 
Group Inc., AAR Corp and Heico Corp.  MRO service providers usually offer different types of 
contracts under which their customers can receive support services, including time and material 
(T&M), fixed-price (FP) and performance-based contracts (PBC).  Different versions of PBC 
have become widely adopted, evolving and transforming the relationship between manufacturers 
and customers in the industry.  For example, recently Boeing aggressively started pursuing 
contracts for its 787 GoldCare program.  As noted in 2006 by a company vice-president, “before 
we were just selling parts, now we are selling airlines a power-by-the-hour service and we are 
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guaranteeing availability”.4  Although PBC is an important factor in the industry, there are no 
published estimates of its actual effect on performance metrics or on supplier profit.  
In this paper, we study the performance implications of the contractual relationship between 
Rolls-Royce, a major supplier of aircraft engines and services to support them, and its customers.  
The dataset we analyze was provided by Rolls-Royce.  Rolls-Royce delivers after-sales repair 
and maintenance services for its customers under two different types of contracts: T&M and 
PBC.  The main difference between the two types of contracts is the mechanism under which the 
customer pays for the support services.  Under a T&M contract the customer pays for the 
materials and resources that are consumed each time a maintenance event occurs.  Under PBC, 
the customer agrees to pay a fee that is proportional to the actual flying hours the customer 
generates from their fleet of aircraft.  (For example, a customer pays $x per flying hour to the 
supplier with a guaranteed minimum number of hours flown per quarter;
5
 note that flying hours 
can be converted into aircraft fleet availability.)  In other words, compensation to Rolls-Royce 
under PBC is directly tied to the performance outcome that the customer values. 
4.  Data 
The dataset consists of five years of data (July 2002 - July 2007, hereafter the observation 
period) of maintenance events (product removals) for different models of aircraft engines 
produced by Rolls-Royce. A removal of the aircraft engine may be necessary due to a part failure 
or for maintenance purposes, resulting in a shop visit to the service supplier.  Removals are 
undesirable events for aircraft owners since an aircraft on-the-ground generally results in high 
opportunity costs, with estimates being as high as hundreds of thousands of dollars per day for a 
non-scheduled failure for a fully loaded wide body commercial aircraft. 
For each product unit, the available variables in our data include: 
 exact time of each product removal in the observation period, 
 cumulative aircraft flying hours at the time of each shop visit, 
 product model, 
 the contract type (T&M or PBC) under which the product receives service, 
                         
4 Lou Mancini, in Airline Business, “Maintenance special report: service culture” (09/26/2006). 
5 Variations of this payment scheme are observed in other settings, especially in the defense industry.  There, many 
PBC contracts are based on a weighted average of different performance metrics (including “soft” metrics like 
customer satisfaction). However, flying hours is the only metric used in Rolls-Royce‟s PBC (“Power by the Hour®”). 
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 aircraft tail number associated with the product, 
 ID of the customer that owns the product, and 
 the list of all products belonging to each customer at the end of the observation period. 
The original data include 9 different product models; among them, there are 4 models where 
the installed base is covered exclusively by PBC contracts.  We therefore limited our sample to 
the remaining 5 product models for which we have data on the removals that occurred under both 
PBC and T&M contracts.  We also discarded some product units that have inconsistent data 
(e.g., reported flying hours at a shop visit in 2006 are less than the flying hours reported in a shop 
visit in 2005).  Our final sample consists of 1,076 removals associated with 763 different product 
units where 78.6% of the product units are covered by PBC.  This sample includes 5 different 
product models and 62 different customers.  The unit of analysis in our main analysis is a 
product unit but we will discuss alternative approaches in Section 6. 
While there are a number of performance metrics that would be of interest in our study (e.g. 
availability, reliability, and cost of ownership), our analysis focuses on product reliability since 
data on other metrics were unavailable in our dataset.  As mentioned in the Introduction, theory 
guides us to believe that different incentive structures under either T&M or PBC contracts should 
be reflected in variations of product reliability.  Among several possible measures of product 
reliability, mean time between removals (MTBR) is the measure that we employ in our analysis 
since it is a key reliability metric that practitioners in the aerospace and defense industry 
constantly monitor.  It represents the average time (flying hours) that a product is used without 
the need for a removal for repair and maintenance purposes.  MTBR is also a key input for the 
estimation of the demand rate for parts consumption and the arrival rate of repair events in 
stochastic models of repairable parts supply chains (see Sherbrooke 1992) which are used to 
compute fleet availability. 
It is important to note that, by definition, MTBR is only a partial representation of the 
physical reliability inherent in the product. To be precise, MTBR is a function of both physical 
reliability and managerial efforts to avoid future failures (e.g., via more frequent scheduled 
maintenance checks).  The natural question is then: is it obvious that higher product reliability 
corresponds to larger MTBR?  Indeed, it seems possible that the supplier who wishes to have a 
more reliable product may actually lower MTBR since he may perform more frequent 
inspections.  Although the answer to this question should ultimately be obtained empirically, it is 
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true that most practitioners view MTBR as a leading indicator of product reliability.  This is so 
because a removal is typically a very costly and time-consuming process which occurs only 
when an engine actually fails randomly in the field or when it is necessary to perform a removal 
to execute a scheduled maintenance check which is mandated at specified time periods.  
Removals, for whatever cause, lead to lack of product availability which leads to reduced value 
generation, and, thus, they are associated with a reduction in reliability.  Consistent with this 
widespread convention in practice, we use the terms product reliability and MTBR 
interchangeably. 
Although use of MTBR as a metric of product reliability is well justified, it still poses 
nontrivial issues for our analysis because removals are quite rare.  In our observation period of 5 
years, the majority of products in the dataset (67%) are removed only one time and another 27% 
are removed only two times
6
 which somewhat limits our ability to compute the true MTBR of a 
product.  Additionally, the data suffers from censoring as information on any removals that 
occurred before July 2002 or after July 2007 are excluded.  Therefore, we build a proxy for 
MTBR that adjusts for the unobserved data and use it as a dependent variable.  There are several 
candidates for such a proxy, but as we show later on, the conclusion of our analysis is quite 
insensitive to proxy choices. 
We illustrate the procedure used to calculate the proxy with an example (see Figure 1). 
Consider a product that was installed in an aircraft at time T0, before the beginning of the 
observation period TB (July 2002 in our case).  Assume that a first removal occurred at time T1 < 
TB, i.e., this removal was unobservable to us.  We observe the 2 removals at times T2 and T3, 
which occurred before the end of the observation period TE.  Let TSN(T) denote the time since 
new (flying hours) of a product at time T.
7
  In the example, the (true) MTBR is given by 
TSN(T3)/3, but we do not observe the first removal and we do not even know if this removal 
took place.  In other words, we only know the values of TB, T2, T3, TE, and the respective 
measures TSN(T2), TSN(T3), and TSN(TE), but not the values of T0 (the time at which the 
product was installed), T1 (the time the first removal occurred), the corresponding flying hours 
TSN(T1), and the initial age of the product at the beginning of the observation period TSN(TB).  
                         
6 It should be noted that the products that were never removed during the observation period are not included in the 
sample, since no removal record exists for them. Therefore, we are in fact considering a conditional MTBR in our 
analysis: i.e. MTBR of a product given that a removal has occurred at least once in the sample period. 
7 Note that TSN is measured in flying hours, i.e. hours of actual activity in the air, which is different from calendar 
time. In Figure 1, the former is shown in the y-axis and the latter is in the x-axis. 
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Figure 1: Example of a removal sequence for a product. 
 
We built a proxy for MTBR to account for the effect of this unobserved data. The proxy is 
defined in the following equation
8
: 
 
TSN(lastet observed removal)  TSN( )
MTBR
# observed removals
BT   
 
In the example, our proxy for the MTBR is given by [TSN(T3)- TSN(TB)]/2.  However, as we 
pointed out, the data do not include the value TSN(TB).  We compute an estimate for TSN(TB), 
say TSN*(TB), by assuming that there was a constant rate of usage for the product throughout the 
observation period.  Specifically, we estimate this value as a linear projection of the line defined 
by the first observed removal and the age of the product measured at the end of the observation 
                         
8 In the robustness section we discuss alternative proxies that treat the data censoring issue differently, and show that 
the results of the paper are not affected by alternative definitions of the MTBR variable. 
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period.  In our example, we estimate the slope of the constant usage line using T2, TE, TSN(T2), 
and TSN(TE).  We then project the line back to TB in order to obtain an estimate of the initial age 
of the product defined as max{0, TSN*(TB)}.  We believe that this approximation provides a 
reasonable estimate for MTBR.  Note that our adjusted measure gives the correct value for 
MTBR if the product was not installed before July 2002.  The bias introduced by this metric will 
vary since it depends on the number of unobserved removals.  We attempt to reduce the potential 
bias by subtracting the initial product age. We have confirmed with managers of the company 
that the magnitude of the estimates based on this approach is in line with actual measures that the 
company tracks. 
Table 1 displays summary statistics for the variables MTBR, the initial age of the product 
(ini_age) and the number of removals (nremovals) in our final sample.  The MTBR and the 
initial age of the product are measured in flying hours. Based on sample averages, products 
covered by T&M contracts have a slightly greater MTBR than PBC products do.  Also note that 
there is more variability in MTBR for products covered by T&M in comparison to PBC 
products. 
 
Overall sample T&M only PBC only 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
MTBR 3441.9 1768.8 3711.7 2336.8 3368.6 1574.2 
ini_age 3381.8 2788.8 4324.9 3314.2 3125.6 2572.1 
nremovals 1.41 0.65 1.25 0.50 1.45 0.68 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
An alternative approach would be to infer MTBR (as an output of the analysis) by estimating 
the underlying distribution of the time between removals using techniques drawn from duration 
modeling (see, for example, Cameron and Trivedi 2005), instead of computing the MTBR for 
each individual product and using it as a dependent variable in the linear regression analysis.  
Duration modeling is a nonlinear regression method that requires estimating the distribution of 
the time between removals.  In fact, the sample in our dataset represents multiple-spell durations, 
since many products have more than one removal.  The main advantage of this estimation 
technique is that it has a built-in mechanism to deal with some of the censoring issues, which are 
common in duration data such as ours.  Unfortunately, there is currently no widely accepted 
econometric procedure to account for endogeneity within the framework of duration modeling.  
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As we noted previously, uncovering endogenous contract choices by customers is a central 
feature of our problem, and thus our purpose is better served by using an alternative two stage 
estimation approach using MTBR as a dependent variable.  Unlike duration modeling, this 
approach allows us to explicitly and consistently deal with the endogeneity that is inherent in the 
data and has important implications for testing our key hypothesis concerning the impact of 
contract choice on reliability.  For this reason, the main part of analysis in the subsequent 
sections builds on this proxy-based approach.  For completeness, we present in Section 6.4 the 
results of an analysis based on one method that combines duration modeling with instrumental 
variables, which has been used by some researchers to account for endogeneity. 
5.  Econometric Model 
We first introduce the econometric framework we use in the analysis, and then elaborate on the 
model specification. 
5.1  Econometric Framework 
Our goal is to build a model that properly captures the effect of contract type on product 
reliability, i.e., MTBR.  A major challenge associated with isolating the true marginal effect of 
different contract types on product reliability is the inherent endogeneity associated with contract 
type choice by customers.  Indeed, customers do not sign on for either a T&M or PBC contract 
randomly, but rather respond to several factors that influence this decision, i.e., self-selection is 
expected in our setting.  A number of empirical studies have considered the issue of contract 
choice decisions by firms in different contexts (see, for example, Slade (1996) for an application 
in the oil industry and Crocker and Reynolds (1993) for an application to the Air Force engine 
procurement process).  In these and other studies, endogeneity of contract choice has been 
regarded as a key econometric issue in testing contract design hypotheses (Masten and Saussier 
2002).  As our results will indicate, there is evidence that endogeneity of contract choice by a 
customer is present in our data as well.  As a consequence, usual ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimation would lead to biased estimates of the marginal effect of contract choice on product 
reliability.  General econometric discussions on the importance of accounting for self-selection 
and related methods can be found elsewhere (e.g., Heckman 1979, Maddala 1983, Greene 2008). 
15 
 
To account for endogeneity present in contract selection, we utilize a two-stage treatment 
effects model (see Maddala 1983, p. 120).  This approach allows us to estimate the effect of a 
binary treatment (PBC) on a numeric outcome (MTBR), given that the treatment assignment is 
not random but rather is determined by an endogenous decision process, which the customer 
carries out.  The approach utilizes a two-stage structure that involves a first stage to explain 
contract choice (Eq. 2) and a second stage to explain product reliability (Eq. 1). 
 
𝒚𝒊 = 𝒙𝒊𝜷 + 𝜹𝒛𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊  (Eq. 1) 
𝒛𝒊 = 𝟙[𝒘𝒊𝜸 + 𝝊𝒊 > 0]  (Eq. 2) 
 
The observed MTBR of product i – denoted by yi – is explained by the exogenous covariates 
xi and the binary endogenous variable zi (that in our case is equal to 1 for products covered by 
PBC contracts and 0 otherwise).  As in standard discrete choice models with latent variable 
representation, e.g., probit, the binary variable for contract choice (zi) is modeled as an indicator 
function, dependent on a set of exogenous covariates wi, which drive the choice process.  The 
error terms (𝜀𝑖 , 𝜐𝑖) of the outcome and choice equations, respectively, account for unobservable 
characteristics which are allowed to be correlated, and are modeled as a bivariate normal random 
variable with distribution 𝑁2(0,0,𝜍
2, 1,𝜌); where the variance of 𝜐𝑖  is normalized to one for 
identification purposes.  If the correlation between both error terms is equal to zero then the 
outcome and choice equations can be estimated independently (Eq. 1 could be estimated by 
OLS), i.e., endogeneity is not relevant for the problem.  For additional information on this 
model, including a discussion of identification, the reader is referred to Maddala (1983, p.117-
125).  A good illustration of the biases that can be generated by not accounting for self-selection 
in an application to firm entry and performance can be found in Shaver (1998). 
5.2  Model Specification 
We postulate that contract type can affect a product‟s MTBR.  As we have discussed, under PBC 
the supplier of the service gets paid in proportion to the flying hours generated by the customer, 
creating an incentive to maintain or improve product reliability.  Theoretical support for this 
hypothesis has been discussed extensively in a previous analytical research (see Kim et al. 2008 
for details).  What then are some of the actions that the supplier and customer can take to 
improve product reliability under PBC?  First, on the supplier side, given that the supplier does 
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not receive any benefit for having product on-the-ground under PBC, he can give priority to 
products covered by PBC through more rapid support service, which in turn increases product 
availability for the PBC customer.  The supplier may also provide a higher quality of service 
(fewer errors, more careful testing, etc.) to a PBC customer.  While this behavior primarily 
impacts service time, it also may indirectly affect product reliability as measured by MTBR 
which captures the frequency of support events.  More directly, the supplier can invest in pre-
emptive maintenance in order to avoid future product failures.  This is particularly important if 
we take into account the fact that there is an important difference between minor product 
revisions / scheduled maintenance checks, for which repair service can take several days, and 
major product failures and maintenance checks, for which the average shop visit takes about 5 
weeks.  Pre-emptive maintenance actions can reduce the frequency and duration of future checks 
as well as lead to fewer failures.  Perhaps the most important impact that the supplier can have 
on reliability, however, is through product re-design and engineering change.  Investment in such 
activity results in a more reliable product and improved versions of parts used for product 
support which supersede existing, less reliable versions. 
On the customer side, the intensity of product utilization and the procedures customers use to 
maintain the product could also impact product reliability.  For example, under a PBC 
arrangement the customer may request removals more frequently and engage in more pre-
emptive maintenance.  They are encouraged to do so under PBC since, beyond opportunity costs, 
there are no direct expenses to the customer associated with a maintenance shop visit.  In 
contrast, T&M customers need to pay for all support services consumed regardless of the impact 
of such services on performance improvement.  This conjecture is in fact in line with the 
statistics displayed in Table 1, that show that on average, the number of removals during the 
observation period is greater for PBC than for T&M products.  The arguments above motivate 
the main hypothesis we test in this research, i.e. product reliability increases under PBC. 
Although we have provided arguments that support this hypothesis, note that while an increased 
number of removals will reduce the observed values of MTBR, pre-emptive maintenance may 
reduce the occurrence of random failures and thus could actually increase the time between 
removals which would increase observed values for MTBR.  The net effect of customer response 
to a PBC is thus, a priori, not obvious and is ultimately an empirical question. 
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Another factor that can influence the observed MTBR is the initial condition of the product.  
In fact, it is expected that older products are more likely to fail than new ones, particularly in the 
case of very old products.  However, it can also be argued that at the very beginning of a 
product‟s life cycle, the product is likely to need more adjustments than mature products do, 
resulting in more frequent shop visits, which can reduce the value of the observed MTBR.  To 
check these conjectures, we plot the distribution of MTBR for different ranges of initial product 
age in Figure 2.  The graph suggests that MTBR is lower for both new and old products, and is 
higher for medium age products, which is in line with the reasoning proposed above.  In fact, 
there appears to be a concave relationship between MTBR and initial age.  In order to account 
for such effects, we include both linear and quadratic terms for the initial age of the product in 
our model specification.  The linear term should take care of the initial increasing trend in 
product reliability, while the quadratic term should reflect the decreased MTBR for old products.  
Since our observation period is five years, it is important to note that we do not necessarily 
observe five years of behavior for all products, as some of them (15%) were new at the 
beginning of the observation period.  This measurement issue also makes it important to control 
for initial age of the product in order to isolate the effect of PBC on MTBR.  
 
 
Figure 2: MTBR vs. Initial age (flying hours). Variable initial age is categorized as follows: 
‟1‟ 0<initial age<=1000, „2‟   1000<initial age<=2000, ...,  „9‟  8000<initial age<=9000, 
„10‟  9000<initial age 
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Finally, product model identity can also be correlated with the MTBR, especially since 
different products in our sample were not launched simultaneously and have different designs.  
We include product model dummies as control variables in the outcome equation of our model 
specification, to account for these factors.  This completes our specification of the outcome 
equation. 
In order to specify the choice equation, we need to include covariates that influence the type 
of contract selected by a customer.  According to supplier managers who we interviewed, a 
factor that greatly influences contract selection is customer size, i.e., customers with a larger fleet 
are more likely to choose a PBC contract for after-sales support.  This conjecture is in line with 
the data: the median fleet size of T&M and PBC customers are 2 and 9, respectively.  We 
measure fleet size as the number of products that a customer has registered with the service 
provider.  A larger fleet size is expected to be associated with greater total fleet-flying-hours (at 
the customer level), e.g., a customer with a fleet of 50 products is likely to have, as a customer, 
more flying hours per year than a customer with 10 products.  This may cause larger firms to 
expect to use the MRO service more frequently, which may influence the likelihood to sign on 
for PBC.
9
  Alternatively, a smaller fleet may lead to more intense use per aircraft, which would 
also lead to more frequent maintenance events, providing an incentive for PBC.  Finally, larger 
customers may have internal capabilities to deal with maintenance and therefore may not desire 
comprehensive coverage through PBC.  Thus, although we do not have a clear theoretical 
prediction with respect to the impact of customer size on the contract choice, we include fleet 
size as a control variable.  Our main model uses the logarithm of fleet size of the customer in the 
choice equation in order to smooth out the distribution of this variable.  Measures of size have 
been widely used to explain contract choice in different contexts; see Lafontaine and Slade 
(2001), and the references therein, for examples. 
Other factors that can influence contract choice for a given product are the value of the 
aircraft equipment, the customer‟s risk profile, and contract terms. These variables, however, 
were not available in our sample.  We note that the product models owned by a customer also 
may be an indicator for some of these factors. For example, product models are expected to 
partially reflect customer fleet valuation.  It can also be the case that customers‟ propensity to 
                         
9 Of course, another major variable that is likely to affect contract choice is pricing.  Unfortunately, we do not 
possess pricing data. 
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repair certain models of products under a particular contract type with the supplier varies 
depending on the product model, due to, e.g., the customer‟s ability to perform certain 
maintenance or repair tasks in-house for particular product models.  In fact, our data show that 
some product models are more likely to be covered by PBC contracts than others: the proportion 
of units covered by PBC contracts is equal to 59.6%, 81.2%, 50.9%, 81.1% and 95.7%, for 
product models 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, respectively. This suggests existence of correlation between 
product model and contract type so we include the product model as a control variable in the 
choice equation. 
Naturally, other variables could have explanatory power for contract choice.  For example, a 
factor that has been recognized to play a role in theoretical models is the level of risk aversion of 
the customer.  Unfortunately, and as has been recognized in previous research, from an empirical 
point of view, it is virtually impossible to measure this factor (Lafontaine and Slade 2001).  
Thus, our specification of the choice equation is somewhat constrained by data availability.
10
  It 
is, however, plausible, that customer fleet size variable is a partial proxy for risk aversion. 
Summarizing, our model specification postulates that the MTBR of a product can be 
explained by the contract type under which the product is serviced (PBC vs. T&M), the product 
age at the beginning of the observation period (linear and quadratic terms), and the product 
model.  Note that these variables are representative of some of the key factors that could drive 
the decision to remove a product for maintenance, i.e., contract terms, nature of the product, and 
the usage environment.  The contract type under which a product is serviced is explained by the 
customer fleet size and the product model. 
Finally, note that our modeling approach allows for correlation between the unobservable 
effects of the outcome and choice equations.  This feature is especially useful since we do not 
observe variables related to the risk profile of the customer, which can influence both product 
reliability and contract choice.  For example, the choice of PBC may be more likely for more 
risky customers, if they expect to use their fleet and MRO services more frequently.  In addition, 
products owned by more risky customers are expected to show a lower MTBR in comparison to 
those owned by low-risk customers, due to the higher risk of failures.  Similar arguments have 
been discussed in the case of extended warranties for new car buyers (Padmanabhan 1995), 
where it is hypothesized that heavy users have stronger incentives than light users to sign on for 
                         
10 We discuss alternative specifications in the robustness section. 
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extended warranties, since their products are more likely to experience failures.  In our case, we 
expect that the correlation between both error terms will be different from zero due to self-
selection of the customers, and in particular, for the reasons outlined above, we expect the 
correlation between both the unobserved effects to be negative. 
6.  Analysis and Results 
6.1  OLS Analysis 
To illustrate the relevance of the endogeneity problem in the isolation of the effect of contract 
choice on MTBR, we begin by estimating the model defined by Eq. 1 using a regular OLS 
regression.  Of course, this does not take into account the self-selection problem by customers 
over contract types, as defined by Eq. 2. Table 2 presents the results obtained with OLS with 
regular standard errors (column 1) and clustered standard errors at the customer level (column 2) 
to account for possible correlations across engines owned by the same customer. 
  Cluster SE 
VARIABLE SE  (customer) 
prodmodel2 -435.4* -435.4 
 (248.1) (376.7) 
prodmodel3 -660.6* -660.6* 
 (310.1) (345.7) 
prodmodel4 -2620*** -2620*** 
 (275.1) (440.1) 
prodmodel5 -1866*** -1866*** 
 (345.7) (503.9) 
ini_age 0.122** 0.122* 
 (0.047) (0.072) 
ini_age_sq -0.00002*** -0.00002** 
 (0.000004) (0.000006) 
PBC -255.3* -255.3 
 (138.6) (338.5) 
Constant 4533*** 4533*** 
 -287.7 (391.7) 
Observations 763 763 
R-squared 0.277 0.277 
Adj. R-squared 0.27 0.27 
 
Table 2: OLS estimation. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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OLS results suggest that there is a negative effect of PBC on product reliability, counter to 
our hypothesis.  This effect is partially significant when regular standard errors are used, and 
largely insignificant under clustered standard errors.  We have argued that contract type is 
endogenous, as it is expected to be correlated with the error term of the regression in Eq. 1 
because of unobserved customer characteristics that are embedded in the error term (e.g. 
customer risk profile) that are also correlated with the contract choice.  If that is the case, OLS 
regression generates biased estimates.  In particular, we have argued that the unobserved term in 
the choice equation is expected to be negatively correlated with the unobserved term in the 
outcome equation, which implies that the OLS coefficient for PBC would be biased downwards. 
6.2  Two-stage Approach: Estimation and Results 
We now turn to the estimation and results obtained for the two-stage model defined by Eqs.1 and 
2. The likelihood for product i is given by: 
 
𝐿𝑖(𝛽, 𝛿, 𝛾,𝜍,𝜌) = [𝑓 𝑦𝑖 𝑧𝑖 = 1 𝑃(𝑧𝑖 = 1)]
𝑧𝑖[𝑓 𝑦𝑖 𝑧𝑖 = 0 𝑃(𝑧𝑖 = 0)]
1−𝑧𝑖  
Given the bivariate normality assumption, 𝝊𝒊  can be expressed as 𝝊𝒊 =
𝝆
𝝈
𝜺𝒊 + 𝜼𝒊 , where 𝜼𝒊 ∼
𝚴(𝟎,𝟏 − 𝝆𝟐), independent of 𝜺𝒊.  The log-likelihood of the model can then be written as: 
 
 𝐿𝐿 𝛽, 𝛿, 𝛾,𝜍,𝜌 
=   𝑧𝑖  −
1
2
 𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖𝛽 − 𝛿 
2
𝜍2
− ln  2𝜋𝜍 + ln Φ 
𝑤𝑖𝛾 +
𝜌
𝜍
 𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖𝛽 − 𝛿 
 𝟏 − 𝝆𝟐
  
𝑁
𝑖=1
+ (1 − 𝑧𝑖)  −
1
2
 𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖𝛽 
2
𝜍2
− ln  2𝜋𝜍 + lnΦ −
𝑤𝑖𝛾 +
𝜌
𝜍
 𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖𝛽 
 𝟏 − 𝝆𝟐
   , 
where  is the cdf of the standard normal distribution.  
We estimate the model in STATA by fully maximizing likelihood.  Table 3 displays the 
results obtained from the two-stage model, including estimates for both the outcome and choice 
equations, considering two types of standard errors.  Columns (1) and (2) display results with 
regular standard errors for the maximum likelihood estimation, while columns (3) and (4) display 
results with clustered standard errors at the customer level. Clustered standard errors at the 
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customer level allow for correlation between products of the same customer, while maintaining 
the independence assumption for products of different customers. This is particularly important 
in our case, as we have argued that the error terms of the outcome and choice equations involve 
customer unobservables.  In the case of cluster standard errors at the customer level, the 
variance-covariance matrix of the estimates involves the computation of the sum of the 
interactions between the residuals and the covariates for each of the products of a given 
customer, which is repeated for each customer (see e.g. Greene 2008 pp.188-190, Wooldridge 
2002 pp.328-331, for further details). 
 
  SE Cluster SE (customer) 
VARIABLE Out. Eq Ch. Eq. Out. Eq Ch. Eq. 
prodmodel2 -667.4*** 0.305 -667.4 0.305 
 (258.5) (0.212) (597.3) (0.659) 
prodmodel3 -568.7* -0.464* -568.7 -0.464 
 (319.9) (0.264) (492.9) (0.564) 
prodmodel4 -2853*** 0.735*** -2853*** 0.735 
 (285.2) (0.239) (566.3) (0.647) 
prodmodel5 -2266*** 1.159*** -2266*** 1.159 
 (362.7) (0.391) (678.6) (0.805) 
ini_age 0.112**  0.112  
 (0.046)  (0.071)  
ini_age_sq -0.00002***  -0.00002***  
 (0.000004)  (0.000007)  
PBC 790.3***  790.3*  
 (248.4)  (460.7)  
lfleetsize  0.468***  0.468*** 
  (0.0436)  (0.146) 
Constant 3936*** -1.403*** 3936*** -1.403* 
 (314.8) (0.248) (615.8) (0.762) 
# Obs. 763 763 763 763 
Table 3: The two-stage model. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 Our estimate for the effect of PBC on MTBR is positive and indicates that, on average 
and all else being equal, PBC increases the MTBR of a product by 790.3 flying hours in our five 
year observation period.  This effect is significant at all relevant significance levels when regular 
standard errors are used, and remains significant when cluster standard errors at the customer 
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level are employed, though only at the 90% confidence level in this case (p-value=0.086)
11
.  For 
the two different standard error measures outlined above, a 90% confidence interval for the 
effect of PBC on MTBR is given by (382, 1199), (32, 1548), respectively.  Results of a 
likelihood ratio test (see e.g. Wooldridge 2002 p. 397) for the null hypothesis of no correlation 
between the error terms of Equations 1 and 2 provide strong statistical evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis of independent equations: p-value<0.001 for SE and p-value=0.0026 for cluster SE 
(customer level).  This is in line with our hypothesis of the endogeneity for the variable PBC, 
confirming that the model cannot be estimated by OLS due to the endogeneity in the contract 
selection decision.  In fact, the estimate of the correlation between both error terms is -0.455, 
also in line with our expectation that they are negatively correlated.  Overall, these results 
provide important support for our main hypothesis that employing PBC increases product 
reliability.  It is important to note that this result is consistent with the results of previous 
economic modeling of performance-based contracts that predict that suppliers will invest more in 
product reliability improvement when they are under a performance contract as compared to 
their behavior under a T&M type of contract (Kim et al. 2008). 
Results in Table 3 also provide support for the hypothesis of a non-linear relationship 
between MTBR and the initial age of the product. The linear term is positive while the quadratic 
term is negative, which suggest a concave functional form, also in line with our data and 
hypothesis, indicating that medium-age products have greater MTBR than very new and very old 
products.  Both coefficients remain significant under the two standard error measures, with the 
exception of the linear term for cluster standard errors at the customer level. The mean of the 
residuals for the predicted MTBRs is -0.0000545, which suggests no general bias in the 
predictions. 
With respect to the choice equation, the results indicate that both fleet size and product model 
dummies have explanatory power, although the latter lose significance under clustered standard 
errors.  In particular, our results show that customers with greater fleet sizes are more likely to 
choose PBC than T&M contracts, in line with our hypothesis, data, and managerial expectations.  
                         
11 We have alternatively considered clustered standard errors at the aircraft level, as it is possible to argue that 
products of the same aircraft type may exhibit some correlation, e.g., given that an aircraft is on-the-ground due to a 
product failure, a customer may be more likely to include other products of the same aircraft type in a shop visit. 
Results under clustered standard errors at the aircraft level are more significant than clustered standard errors at the 
customer level, i.e. we are reporting the most conservative case. In particular, under clustered standard errors at the 
aircraft level, the p-value for the PBC coefficient is 0.003. 
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This result holds no matter what standard errors are used.  The choice model correctly predicts 
81.1% of the observations in the sample, in line with accuracy levels reported in related 
applications in the literature (e.g. Terwiesch et al. 2005). 
6.3  Robustness Checks 
We have shown that our main result – the positive effect of PBC on MTBR – is robust to 
different standard error measures, given our specification.  In this section we perform further 
robustness checks of our results to alternative model specifications.  For simplicity, we focus the 
analysis on our main hypothesis that PBC increases product MTBR.  
First, we consider several specifications that vary between original scale and logarithmic 
forms for our numeric variables.  Our main model uses the logarithm of fleet size of the customer 
in the choice equation in order to smooth out the distribution of this variable.  If we use the 
original scale variable (fleet size) instead of the logarithm form – so that all the numeric 
explanatory variables are in their original form – our estimate for PBC is 699 (p-value=0.012; 
0.362, for the two standard error measures, respectively).  Similarly, if we use logarithms instead 
of the original scale values for the linear and quadratic terms of initial age in the outcome 
equation – so that all the numeric explanatory variables are in logarithm form – our estimate for 
PBC is 887 (p-value=0.000; 0.049).  
Second, we consider the inclusion of other variables in the choice equation.  For example, if 
we view the initial age of the product as a proxy for the risk of specific customer equipment, it 
can be argued that the initial age of the product can influence the decision of a customer to 
choose PBC instead of T&M contracts.  When a linear term for the initial age of the product is 
included in the choice equation, the estimate for PBC is 790 (p-value=0.002; 0.092); when both a 
linear and a quadratic term are included, the estimate for PBC is 787 (p-value=0.002; 0.088). 
Similarly, a factor that can influence the decision of the type of contract is the expected usage 
of the service.  It can be hypothesized that customers that expect to use their fleet more 
frequently are more likely to choose PBC contracts.  Such customers may give more weight to 
having access to future maintenance services without having to make a payment for the resources 
consumed each time the service is needed.  We consider different measures that attempt to 
capture aggregate customer usage: average usage per year and several ranking indicators across 
customers based on average usage per year.  Our estimates for PBC are in the range 391 to 842, 
25 
 
with p-values ranging from 0.001 to 0.1, depending on the proxy used to capture this effect.  
Ideally, we would calculate a proxy for the expected frequency of usage based on, for example, 
pre-sample data, to derive an exogenous measure not directly related with our measure of MTBR 
thus avoiding circularity problems.  In the absence of this exogenous source though, we built the 
proxies for this variable (as indicated above) based on our in-sample data.  
Our estimates for the effect of PBC on MTBR of a product are remarkably robust to many 
model variations.  The main finding that PBC has a positive and significant marginal effect on 
product MTBR remains robust in virtually all cases, with coefficients ranging from 391 to 887 
flying hours. Equally importantly, our tests reject the null hypothesis of uncorrelated error terms 
(outcome and choice equations) in all cases, providing strong evidence to support the self-
selection hypothesis, which justifies our econometric modeling approach. 
We also test the robustness of the results with respect to the definition of the variable MTBR. 
We have discussed the assumptions and approximations used to calculate the MTBR variable in 
section 3, in particular, we noted the censoring issue in our data. We explore three alternative 
proxies that involve a different treatment of the censored data, which we define using the 
example in Figure 1 (we use different names for clarity): 
 
 MTBE = average{TSN(T2) – TSN(TB), TSN(T3) – TSN(T2), TSN(TE) – TSN(T3)}. 
 MAXMTBRMTBE = max{MTBR, MTBE} 
 InvFRate = [TSN(TE) – TSN(TB)]/[number of observed removals]  
 
Thus, the MTBE (mean time between events) includes the most recent portion of the time in 
which an engine was not removed, i.e., it considers that as an „event‟. The MAXMTBRMTBE 
also includes that information by contrasting the MTBE with the MTBR.  Finally, the InvFRate 
represents the inverse of the failure rate, the latter being calculated as the number of observed 
removals over the flying hours of an engine during the observation period.  Our main findings 
remain robust to these three variations.  When OLS is used for estimation, PBC has a negative 
effect on reliability.  When our two-stage approach is used to estimate the model, we find a 
positive and significant effect of PBC on product reliability.
 12
  In all cases, likelihood ratio tests 
confirm the endogeneity of the contract choice variable. The coefficient of PBC remains 
essentially in the same range: 470.9 (MTBE), 744.9 (MAXMTBRMTBE), 751.2 (InvFRate).  
                         
12Significance is lost when clustered standard errors at the customer level are used though. 
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These experiments confirm the main findings obtained with our base model, i.e. when the 
endogeneity inherent to contract choice is accounted for, PBC have a positive effect on product 
reliability. 
6.4  Duration Model Analysis 
Thus far, our analysis has relied on constructing proxies for the MTBR of each product and 
performing a two-stage estimation.  As mentioned earlier, the duration model offers an 
alternative way to analyze our data, despite its aforementioned deficiency related to 
incorporating endogeneity into the model.  As research on how to deal with this issue is ongoing, 
currently there is no agreed upon method or statistical package that we can adopt for our 
purposes (see Bijwaard (2007) for a recent contribution to this research stream).  However, the 
following informal approach has been used by some researchers: (1) run the probit model (Eq. 2) 
to predict contract choices, (2) calculate the selectivity term from this analysis, and (3) perform 
duration analysis using the computed residuals as one of the regressors.  A similar approach in 
the context of sample selection for duration models was used by Rao et al. (2001), based on the 
generalization of the Heckman selection model proposed in Lee (1983).  Although consistency of 
this approach is not, to our knowledge, yet fully established, we use this procedure in this 
subsection as a final robustness check. 
In order to proceed with this approach, we must analyze the data at the removal level (instead 
of at the product level), and we must examine the influence of contract type on the respective 
removal rates.  As is standard in duration analysis, we conduct experiments using both semi-
parametric (Cox) and parametric (exponential, log-logistic, and log-normal) transition rate 
models.  Beyond the change in the dependent variable, the explanatory variables remain the 
same; the only modification in explanatory variables we incorporated is to replace the initial age 
of the product with the age of the product at the time of the previous removal (if any) in Eq. 1.
13
  
We estimate the models in STATA, using clustered standard errors at the customer level.  When 
the models are estimated disregarding the endogeneity of PBC, we find that PBC has a positive 
effect on the removal rate, i.e., analogously to the OLS analysis of the MTBR, we find that PBC 
decreases reliability.  This effect is non-significant no matter which hazard rate model is used.  
                         
13 For example, for the 3rd removal of a product unit, instead of the initial age (age of the product at the beginning of 
the sample period) we include the age of the product unit at the moment of the 2nd removal (for both the linear and 
quadratic terms). 
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To account for endogeneity in duration models, we employ the two-stage procedure 
described above: first, we run a probit regression to estimate the contract choice equation (Eq. 2). 
From the results of this first stage, a selectivity term can be derived as follows (see e.g. Maddala 
1983 p.121): 
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚_𝑖 =
 
 
 
𝜙(𝑤𝑖𝛾)
Φ(𝑤𝑖𝛾)
 , 𝑖𝑓 𝑧𝑖 = 1
−𝜙(𝑤𝑖𝛾)
1−Φ(𝑤𝑖𝛾)
 , 𝑖𝑓 𝑧𝑖 = 0
  
Here,  and  are the density and the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal 
variable.  This selectivity term is then used as an explanatory variable in the hazard rate model, 
as a way to capture the true effect of PBC on the removal rate taking into account the self-
selection involved in the PBC variable.  Using this procedure, we find a negative and significant 
effect of PBC on the removal rate, in all of the four different semi-parametric and parametric 
transition rate models under consideration.  Thus, the conclusion that PBC increases reliability 
remains the same under this alternative modeling approach, which also reaffirms the relevance of 
accounting for endogeneity to estimate the effect of PBC.  We suppress detailed output from the 
duration model analysis for the sake of brevity but we conclude that this analysis is consistent 
with the two-stage approach that we utilize in the rest of the paper. 
6.5  Limitations 
Although we have shown that there is strong evidence to support our conclusions, our analysis is 
not free of limitations.  There are several issues regarding the nature of the data.  First, we 
analyze product removals from an aircraft, and calculate a proxy for product reliability for the 
products we observed, which are those products that were removed from an aircraft at least once 
during the observation period.  Thus, our analysis is driven by the nature of our dependent 
variable, the mean time between removals.  Our analysis is silent, however, with respect to those 
products that were never removed.  Second, in our sample we observe a small proportion of 
products covered by T&M contracts (21.4%), which may suggest the risk of sample selection 
bias.  Recall that we use data from only one supplier in the market, so it is possible that 
customers that prefer a T&M contract scheme choose a different supplier for their repair and 
maintenance service.  Naturally, we do not observe such customers, and we do not have any 
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basis to construct a model to explain a potential sample selection of suppliers by customers.
14
  
Although our study is limited in this regard, we nonetheless believe that the insights from our 
analysis are relevant to wide range of firms, especially those in the aerospace and defense 
industry which are undergoing a major shift toward the PBC approach.  Moreover, to make sure 
that the uneven proportion of PBC and T&M products in our sample is not playing a role in our 
results, we conduct further experiments estimating our model with balanced samples (50% PBC, 
50% T&M) by randomly selecting units from the pool of PBC observations; our results and main 
findings remain qualitatively the same under this variation. Third, while our dataset is rich in 
terms for characterizing the removal incidents for a given product, we have only limited data to 
characterize a customer.  In particular, unobservables related to customer risk profile and 
behavior might have an impact on our results.  It is also true that our dataset is not rich in 
describing the specific terms of the contracts in each case; we only distinguish between T&M 
contracts and PBC.  This does not allow us to explore the influence of price and other contract 
conditions on the customer‟s contract choice although the supplier suggested to us that there are 
no major differences in contract parameters: most of them are signed at common list prices.  
Finally, we do not observe data before/after adoption of PBC, which would have made possible 
to study the dynamics, e.g., by using difference-in-differences estimators. 
With respect to our modeling approach, the main assumption we impose is the exogeneity of 
the independent variables (other than PBC) in our model specification.  In essence, we assume 
that the unobservables related to customer risk profile and behavior are uncorrelated with the 
initial age of the product, the product model and the fleet size.  This assumption rules out the 
possibility that customer behavior might vary depending on the initial age of the product, or that 
customer risk exposure will change for different product models.  Thus, while our approach 
explicitly deals with the endogeneity of contract choice, our results need to be understood in the 
context of the exogeneity assumption for the rest of the covariates. 
7.  Conclusion 
                         
14 The supplier has informed us that the majority of their products are covered by PBC contracts while maintenance 
for the majority of T&M removals is conducted by independent contractors.  Such contractors generally have a good 
reputation for both cost and turnaround time, but their impact on reliability is unknown.  These observations are 
consistent with our sample. 
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We have examined the impact of performance-based contracts on product reliability (as 
measured by the time between removals), in an application to the aerospace and defense 
maintenance and repair services industry.  Using a proprietary dataset from Rolls-Royce, a major 
supplier of engines, we propose a two-stage approach that allows us to explicitly account for the 
endogeneity inherent in contract choice by a customer.  The first stage of the econometric model 
describes the customer decision with respect to selecting a contract and the second stage analyzes 
the impact of contract type on product reliability.  Our analysis shows that there is a positive and 
statistically significant effect of PBC on the MTBR of a product, i.e., performance-based 
contracts induce improvements in product reliability in our sample.  Our estimates indicate 
reliability improvements under PBC in the 10-25% range, in comparison to traditional T&M 
contracts. We have also shown that there is strong statistical evidence to support the hypothesis 
of correlation between the error terms of the outcome and choice equations, confirming that the 
coefficient of PBC cannot be identified without taking into account the inherent endogeneity of 
contract type selection by customers.  These findings are supported by several robustness checks 
under a number of alternative model specifications, which also allowed us to measure the impact 
of other covariates on product reliability and contract choice.  
Our analysis focuses on the marginal effect of performance-based contracts on product 
reliability.  Our results provide a first step towards understanding the overall impact of 
performance-based contracts, and our approach was largely driven by data availability.  The 
availability of richer data about customers, financial and managerial information, and the specific 
contract terms between them and the supplier, would enable a more complete analysis to cover a 
number of open questions.  Such analysis, which is underway by the authors, could lead to a 
deeper understanding of the benefits of PBC contracts, e.g., what drives reliability improvement?  
Is this reliability improvement profitable to the supplier?  Does the cost of pre-emptive 
maintenance exceed the benefits due to reliability improvement? Is the price charged to the 
customer appropriate?  How do specific contract terms moderate the impact on reliability?  
These questions remain open for future research. 
This paper is one of the few studies that empirically estimate the impact of a performance vs. 
non-performance contract type and other causal factors on supply chain outcomes.  Our findings 
are relevant not only to the aircraft repair and maintenance service industry but also to all 
industries that provide after-sales support for mission critical products.  The results are especially 
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relevant for practitioners since this is the first attempt to test the reliability improvement 
hypothesis for performance contracting based on transactional data.  While there are numerous 
papers that model various supply chain contracts, there is little empirical evidence of the impact 
of such contracts on supply chain outcomes.  Our paper thus makes a step in closing the gap 
between theoretic modeling and empirical evidence.   
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